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НазваEssay in Microeconomics (реферат)
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РозділІноземна мова, реферати англійською, німецькою
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Student: Matyukhin Anton,

 

2 group.

 

Teacher: Alla Friedman.

 

Международный Институт Экономики и Финансов, 3 курс.

 

Высшая Школа Экономики

 

Essay in Microeconomics.

 

Topic:

 

Is Collusion Possible?

 

18.12.2000

 

Contents:

 

Introduction.

 

Two types of behaviour (Collusive and non-collusive).

 

Game theory.

 

Concept.

 

The problem of collusion.

 

Predatory pricing.

 

Repeated games approach.

 

Concept.

 

Finite game case.

 

Infinite game case.

 

“Trigger” strategy

 

Tit-for-Tat.

 

d.) Finite game case, Kreps approach.

 

The motives for retaliation.

 

Conclusion.

 

Bibliography.

 

Introduction.

 

In this essay I would discuss the price and output determination

under the one essential type of imperfect competition markets-

oligopoly. Inter-firm interactions in imperfect markets take many forms.

Oligopoly theory, those name refers to “competition among the few”, lack

unambiguous results of these interactions unlike monopoly and perfect

competition. There is a variety of results derived from many different

behavioural assumptions, with each specific model potentially relevant

to certain real-world situations, but not to others.

 

Here we are interested in the strategic nature of competition between

firms. “Strategic” means the dependence of each person’s proper choice

of action on what he expects the other to do. A strategic move of a

person influences the other person’s choice, the other person’s

expectation of how would this particular person behave, in order to

produce the favourable outcome for him.

 

Two types of behaviour (Collusive and non-collusive).

 

Models of enterprise decision making in oligopoly derive their

special features from the fact that firms in an oligopolistic industry

are interdependent and this is realised by these firms. When there are

only a few producers, the reaction of rivals should be taken into

account. There are two broad approaches to this problem.

 

First, oligopolists may be thought of as agreeing to co-operate in

setting price and quantity. This would be the Collusive model. According

to this model, firms agree to act together in their price and quantity

decisions and this would to exactly the same outcome as would have been

under monopoly. Thus the explicit or co-operative collusion or Cartel

would take place.

 

Second approach of the oligopoly analysis is based on the assumption

that firms do not co-operate, but make their decisions on the basis of

guesses, expectations, about the variables to which their competitors

are reaching and about the form and the nature of the reactions in

question. The Non-collusive behaviour deals with this model. Here,

though in equilibrium the expectations of each firm about the reactions

of rivals are realised, the parties never actually communicate directly

with each other about their likely reactions. The extreme case of this

can even imply competitive behaviour. Such a situation is much less

profitable for firms than the one in which they share the monopolistic

profit. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the case of the

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